agall, in the barony of Massareene Upper, in Southwest County Antrim.² In the early s transatlantic mail was expensive, and its delivery uncertain. Consequently, Irish immigrant correspondence was filled primarily with information that was, for its authors and recipients, vitally important but which often appears to contemporary scholars as mundanely personal or familial. The principal subjects of William Coyne's letter, however, were very public and quite dramatic, and his missive's exceptional character indicates that he and his neighbors in Belfast considered the developments he described to be extraordinarily significant-and that he assumed his brother in faraway America would consider them equally so. Hopefully, social and political historians of early nineteenth-century Ulster will also find Coyne's letter of interest. 
is in England his Church is Converted into a Muslin ware-house and ocupied by an old acquentaince of yours W m Shaw⁴ who is an acting Partner in a Concern that is doeing a good dale of business at present however trade is in general but verry flat⁵ yet thank God I have had the best of work Since I went to M r Bell ⁶ and the two oldest boys Henry and John is doeing pretty well at the Loom. We have now and then a little Stir as usual between the Weavers and Manifecturiers particularly Thomas How and Frank Johnson⁷ Several voilant attacts have been made
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. The following transcript reproduces William Coyne's original punctuation and spelling-the latter often indicating his pronunciation, e.g., dale (deal), attact (attack), extronary (extraordinary), rachedness (wretchedness), laveing (leaving), etc. Occasionally the text is emended by explanatory footnotes or by the insertion of square-bracketed words in the text itself. This minimal editing may cause readers some difficulty, in part because Coyne frequently abbreviated words and/or omitted vowels or entire syllables; thus, rec d (received); Dec r , Feb y (December, February); Covred, covring (Covered, covering) ; evry (every); modrate (moderate); etc. Also, Coyne often employed commas in place of apostrophes-e.g., M 'Pharson, s recorded the death, eight days earlier, of "Thomas How, Esq., merchant, aged  years."
Frank Johnson: Francis Johnson, a leading muslin manufacturer at North Street, on Peter's Hill. According to Jonathan Bardon's History of Ulster, , Johnson was a "hated employer" whose home had been attacked at least once before (as Coyne's letter states), in summer , by "[d]esperate weavers" who daubed it with tar and set it on fire. Bardon, History of Ulster, . On  Jan. , the BNL printed a lengthy announcement of "the death of our worthy and lamented townsman, Mr.  , another victim to the dreadful scourge, Typhus Fever, with which our town is so severely visited. According to his obituary, Johnson's "character was held in the most elevated range by his fellow-citizens. . . . for he was honest, ingenuous, and single-hearted; possessing a cultivated mind, talent, and integrity. In religion and morality, a bright example-in politics, liberal and constitutional-as a merchant, useful and intelligent-and for firmness and unshrinking determination, a man scarcely to be equalled. To his resolute conduct, the country is indebted for the preservation of its most useful manufactures. He was cool, dispassionate, and humane, and amidst difficulties that might have paled a less determined heart, he succeeded in putting down a system of combination which threatened to subvert the very basis of every principle of commercial good order." . According to the Belfast News-Letter, the rewards offered for the apprehension of Francis Johnson's assailants soon proved effective. By August  the alleged culprits, all journeyman weavers from the outskirts of Belfast in North County Down, had been captured, tried, and convicted. In September, two of them were hanged, in Belfast's last public execution. Another was transported for life to New South Wales, and two others were whipped publicly and imprisoned for eighteen months. At least four clergymen were present at the hangings, before which the condemned men made repentant speeches: "I have offended God," one admitted, "dishonoured religion, and injured society, for which I am truly sorry."¹⁹ Thus was smashed what the NewsLetter later called "a system of combination which threatened to subvert the very basis of every principle of commercial good order."²⁰ In reality, commerce and industry in early nineteenth-century Belfast, and in Ulster generally, were scarcely in "good order," and the assault on Johnson's house and business premises can be understood only in the contexts of the profound economic dislocations and often severe distress that afflicted northern Irish society in the decades following the Act of Union. Between  and  Belfast's population increased from about , to more than ,, as men and women from rural Ulster migrated to the city or its hinterland to work as handloom weavers or as spinners in cotton factories and, increasingly after , in linen mills. However, economic growth was unsteady and its prosperity distributed very unevenly. In  the American embargo acts, followed by the Anglo-American War of , caused bankruptcies and unemployment. In  the return of peace precipitated a depression in the textile industry, the effects of which on the laboring poor, in town and country alike, were exacerbated by poor harvests, rising food and fuel prices, and outbreaks of typhus. In the mid-s the crisis deepened when severe industrial depression throughout the United Kingdom coincided with Parliament's withdrawal of tariff protection for Irish cotton goods.
By the early s Ulster's cotton industry had been eclipsed by linen manufacturing, but although the latter expanded and flourished, most of its new factories and economic advantages were concentrated in the province's eastern corner. Beyond the vicinity of Belfast and a few other East Ulster towns, cottage wages and industries collapsed. Rural spinners could not compete with cheap, factory-spun thread, and country weavers could rarely survive far from eastern supplies of yarn and the industry's principal markets. Social conditions among the North's rural poor rapidly deteriorated, but living standards among weavers in Belfast and other towns also declined sharply. In  a visitor to Belfast had claimed its cotton weavers earned at least s. per week, but their wages had begun to decline before , and by the mid-s, when one-third of the city's weavers were unemployed, wages had fallen to merely s. per week. In the early s the Belfast News-Letter reported that the weavers in the Belfast suburb of Ballymacarrett were obliged to eat "oatmeal unfit for cattle" and were "reduced to skeletons from overwork and lack of sleep." In  local weaver James Boyd claimed that he and his peers labored daily from fourteen to eighteen hours for as little as s. d. per week, while others testified that Belfast's working-class neighborhoods were "a mass of filth and misery."²¹ Socioeconomic strife among northern Irish Protestants had been common at least since the Oakboy and Steelboy uprisings of the s and early s. In the s poor Ulster Protestants' affiliations with the violent activities of either the United Irishmen or the Loyal Orange Order had stemmed, at least in part, from economic anxieties. After  the unsettling processes and inequitable results of industrialization (which spelled de-industrialization for most of the countryside) provoked among Ulster's poor-especially among proletarianized weavers in and around Belfast-new waves of anger, organization, protest, and reprisal against perceived exploitation. As early as  the Belfast News-Letter expressed concern about the spread of trade unionism among the town's workers. In  Lisburn's cotton weavers formed an illegal "combination" and destroyed the webs and looms of those who would not work for what union members considered "fair wages." In April  the Lisburn weavers' march into Belfast, to protest wage reductions, resulted in riots when police tried to arrest their leaders. Thus, in  the North Down weavers' attack on Francis Johnson's house was only one of the most dramatic examples of contemporary class conflict. Indeed, the execution of Johnson's assailants seems to have had no immediate effects. Throughout  the News-Letter continued to bewail the "outrages"-rivaling in frequency and severity those in proverbially "disturbed" Tipperarycommitted largely by Presbyterian weavers and other poor Protestants on the persons, livestock, homes, and businesses of East Ulster's landlords, agents, bailiffs, strong farmers, and manufacturers.²² Yet by the s evidence of strong or violent social or class conflict among Protestants in Belfast and elsewhere in Ulster seems to have virtually disappeared. For example, in  James Campbell, a Belfast manufacturer, testified that weavers' combinations had been extinct for more than a decade; ever since , Campbell reported, "labour [was] perfectly free" in the city's textile industries, and he rejoiced that, even when faced with wage cuts, his workers' behavior was "very respectful and proper." Likewise, although in Belfast and elsewhere in Ulster the franchise was extremely restricted, and political power monopolized by a wealthy few, the s witnessed in Protestant Ulster no workers' movement for equal rights that was remotely comparable to the Chartist agitation in Britain. Indeed, it was particularly during these pre-famine decades that visitors to Belfast and to East Ulster, generally, became lavish in their praise for the "industriousness" and "steadiness" exhibited by the city's and the region's inhabitants. Significantly, observers, native as well as foreign, almost invariably associated this "spirit of commercial enterprise" with Protestantism, the benign effects of the Act of Union, and equally salutary "British" influences. Thus, in  the Halls concluded that Belfast was full of "English virtues-'so much bustle, such an aspect of business, a total absence of all suspicion of [that] ideleness'" and insubordination which, they believed, characterized southern Ireland and its Catholic populace.²³ How and why had this remarkable transformation occurred? How had Ulster's turbulent Protestant underclass been transformed into alleged exemplars of industry and deference? Put another way, how had Protestant Ulster's upper and middle classes, so beleaguered in the early s, succeeded in forging a sense of pan-Protestant identity and community, characterized by unionist loyalties and bourgeois social norms, that usually transcended social and denominational divisions?
According to Rev. Henry Cooke and others, Belfast's and East Ulster's vaunted economic growth explained their Protestant inhabitants' contentment with both the union and élite rule, and their allclass unity in the face of Catholic nationalist agitation. But as we have seen, the North's prosperity was by no means widespread, even among Protestants. Another explanation for Protestant workers' apparent docility was put forth by Alexander Moncrieffe, a Belfast manufacturer, who in  testified before a Parliamentary commission that "Catholic and Orange rivalries made trade unionism impossible and ensured a supply of cheap labor."²⁴ Yet Moncrieffe's assertion confuses cause and effect. It appears based on the assumption that ProtestantCatholic animosities were, if not primordial and inevitable, at least always sufficient in themselves to mitigate intracommunal class conflict and to ensure that poor Protestants would defer to the leadership and embrace the capitalist values of their wealthy co-religionists.
The processes by which Ulster's Protestant élites achieved sociocultural and political hegemony over the Protestant poor may have been much more complex than either Cooke's or Moncrieffe's explanation implies. Indeed, it is likely that the construction of the "Ulster Unionist community" had many of its most important origins neither in shared Protestant prosperity nor in Protestant-Catholic strife (local or national), but rather in the upper-and middle-class resolutions of the class struggle revealed by the incident described in William Coyne's  letter.
For example, in the early s it was by no means certain that Ulster's predominantly Anglican upper class and its largely Presbyterian middle classes (themselves bitterly divided over contemporary political and religious issues, including the United Irishmen's legacy) could join to present a united front to their own subtenants and laborers.²⁵ Yet in the aftermath of the weavers' assault on Francis Johnson's home, Belfast's and East Ulster's gentry, magistrates, merchants, and manufacturers-Anglicans and Presbyterians, Whigs and Toriesunited as "gentlemen" and mobilized their considerable resources against the workers' threat to property and order.²⁶ Surely this was not an isolated instance of such convergence. Given the prevalence of lower-class unrest and violence in the early s, the mobilization of élite opinion, if not overt power, concerning class issues must have . Boyle, Irish Labor Movement, -. . Significantly, the Belfast News-Letter's campaign against East Ulster's lowerclass Protestant combinations occurred simultaneously with its crusade to purge the city's Academical Institute of faculty and students who allegedly harbored "disloyal" and "heretical" opinions-e.g., see the issue of  May.
. BNL,  March .
become semi-permanent and self-perpetuating, creating common interests and sympathies that could transcend other differences. Equally important is that after  a re-formed Ulster Protestant élite could no longer rely solely or even primarily on its own legal and military resources to confront lower-class insubordination, because after the union statutory power and its enforcement were centered in London and Dublin Castle. To be sure, members of the Ulster Protestant gentry and magistracy often chafed at British reforms that, by professionalizing the Irish legal and policing systems, reduced their autonomy and increased their dependence on British authority. In the crisis of the early s, however, when it appeared that "commercial good order" teetered on the brink of collapse, their own spokesmen cried out for strong, effective action that could emanate only from Westminster and Dublin. Thus, in late  the Belfast News-Letter's exasperated editor announced that, since "declarations, resolutions, and subscriptions have been tried and found unavailing[, new] energy must be infused, [new] measures must be matured and acted upon to reclaim the misguided multitude." If landlords and manufacturers could not convince their tenants and workers by traditional means of "the illegality of their proceedings, . . . stronger [methods] will have to be resorted to"; for otherwise, he warned, "the turbulent [will only] become more audacious."²⁷ In short, Ulster's Protestant upper and middle classes were obliged not only to unite but also to rely heavily on the coercive mechanisms of the post-union British state to regain authority over their refractory inferiors. In the process, they inevitably developed a community of interest both among each other and with the union that was now their first and last reliance in their efforts to tame the nocturnal armies of "idle vagabonds" who assailed them.²⁸ For the union protected Irish Protestants, generally, by submerging Ireland's Catholics in a British Protestant majority. At least equally important, it protected propertied Irish Protestants against Protestant "men of no property" by merging the interests of the smaller, weaker, and more vulnerable Irish élite . BNL,  Aug. . In  the News-Letter also lobbied intensively for the creation of a more effective police force in Belfast-e.g., the issue of  Sep. In the same year the British Parliament responded with a Police Act that increased the authority of the city's police commissioners.
. BNL,  Sep. .
with those of Britain's ruling classes-then perhaps the most dynamic and powerful in the world. Unlike Ireland's Catholic élites, who felt alienated and betrayed when denied their promised Emancipation for three decades after , propertied Protestants soon enjoyed every reason to be loyal to a British government that long proved able, in Ireland and Britain alike, to protect essential upper-class privileges, to placate middle-class (Protestant) demands, and to suppress or neutralize lower-class challenges. For seventy years after the Act of Union, Westminster denied Ulster farmers' every plea for the legalization of tenant-right, passing instead a series of subletting acts and other laws that augmented landlords' authority over their tenants. Ulster's manufacturers were no doubt equally gratified, as in , for example, when Parliament legislated for Ireland a special anti-combination act, the terms of which were "decidedly harsher" than either the earlier laws passed by the Irish Parliament or the post-union acts that applied only to British workers.²⁹ In addition, the union's alliance of Irish and British property buttressed Ulster's Protestant élite in its class-biased interpretation and enforcement of both those and ordinary laws. Thus, in late , only a few months after the two weavers were hanged in Belfast for bombing Francis Johnson's home, John McCann, a manufacturer in Lisburn, was acquitted of murdering his employee, Gordon Maxwell, the leader of the muslin weavers' union, on Belfast's Malone Road, despite Maxwell's dying declaration that McCann was his killer. And of course it was ultimately by British authority that thousands of convicted Irishmen and women were transported to the Australian penal coloniesnearly six thousand between  and  alone-many of them for violating the combination acts.³⁰ Many mechanisms of élite persuasion, however, depended neither on overt force nor on British legislative or administrative authority. Indeed, if ordinary Ulster Protestants were to internalize the lessons which their superiors wished to inculcate, the latter needed to initiate a variety of measures offering rewards as well as punishments. It was significant, to be sure, that  witnessed not only the weavers' assault on Johnson's premises but also the establishment in Belfast of a House of Correction-a new prison with a strict work regimen designed to instill "morals and industry" among its seventy-five to one hundred inmates.³¹ At least equally important, however, was the sort of initiative that William Coyne described in his eulogy of the new Belfast Savings Bank, "instituted for the Savings of the poor and . . . conducted by . . . the principle Magastrates and Bankers of the town." Such charitable efforts by Ulster's upper and middle classes were most obvious in cities such as Belfast but were not confined there, as during the early s benevolent loan societies, usually operated by local landlords and Protestant clergymen, sprang up in towns and villages throughout the island. At least equally pervasive and effective were the pan-Protestant revivals of the Second Reformation and the host of charitable and educational institutions that were established or transformed and invigorated under their inspiration. The financial, political, and ideological linkages between Irish revivalism and upper-and middle-class Irish (and British) Protestant loyalism and conservatism are well-known, as all sought to purge Protestant (as well as Catholic) Irish society of the Jacobin "French diseases" of political radicalism, religious infidelity, and lower-class insubordination. In this respect, the new Hibernian Sunday Schools that flourished in East and mid-Ulster were but one example of the new forces that contributed to "the inculcation of religious respectability which was so prominent a feature of nineteenthcentury Ulster life."³² Perhaps less obvious are the quasi-charitable and material benefits of lower-class Protestant membership in the Orange Order and in Ulster's disproportionately large Yeomanry corps. Surely a crucial function of the Orange lodges, for example, was to insulate its ordinary Protestant members against the dangers of eviction, unemployment, and emigration. Likewise, during the economically distressed early s the pay that plebeian Yeomen earned for their service was perhaps at least as important as-indeed, was inseparable from-the political and psychological status conferred by this evidence of their commitment to the Union and to their élite officers' definitions of law and order.³³ Like the Petty Sessions Courts (established in ), such bodies reinforced hierarchy and deference on local levels and connected those local relationships with supra-local or metropolitan rules, institutions, and power structures. In Ulster especially, perhaps, they not only strengthened traditional, cross-class social bonds but also instilled, encouraged, and rewarded new proto-bourgeois habits and outlooks compatible with the needs of commercialization and industrialization.³⁴ Equally important, they sifted Ulster's and Ireland's inhabitants into two broad groups-the "loyal" and the "disloyal," the "respectable" and the "insubordinate," the "worthy" and the "unworthy" of patronage and respect-and ensured that ultimately the distinctions between them would be made almost invariably on Protestant versus Orange Order and the Yeomanry had other symbiotic relationships that greatly benefited their overlapping memberships. For instance, yeomen enjoyed easy legal and financial access to firearms, which in turn gave Orangemen an enormous advantage over their Catholic competitors (note the generally huge discrepancies between Protestant and Catholic casualty rates resulting from early nineteenth-century Orange-Green clashes). At the risk of cynicism, moreover, it is arguable that one of the Orange Order's important functions was to provoke what would be denominated as "Catholic aggression" against the "Protestant community" and "rebellious conspiracy" against the union, either of which demanded the mobilization of the Yeomanry and hence extra service pay for its members.
Scholars who emphasize the often contentious relationships between élite and plebeian Orangeism may disagree with this essay's implicit argument as to the importance of the Orange Order's role in enforcing upper-and middle-class hegemony. I suggest, however, that the distinctions some historians make between the two phenomena have been overdrawn, in part because I suspect that local studies would demonstrate the dominance, in virtually every Orange Lodge, of small gentry, clergymen, or, perhaps most important, of middle-, lower middle-, or quasi-middle-class men of local status, influence, and "reputation," whose socioeconomic roles and functions constituted vital linkages of authority and dependence in Ulster society (both rural and urban-industrial often expedient or even "insincere," as Dublin Castle recognized.³⁷ Likewise, in the s loyal Protestants felt obliged to "all show themselves" in the annual Twelfth of July parades, as one Orangeman demanded, "else how could we tell whether they are of the right or wrong sort?"³⁸ Yet at least equally important was that these distinctions were made and pressures imposed along class lines as well. During the social crises of the early s, Irish municipal authorities often instructed parish relief committees not to grant charity to applicants who lacked certificates of "good character" from clergymen or employers, testifying, for example, to the petitioners' non-membership in working-class combinations.³⁹ Similarly, Ulster's few remaining "rhyming weavers"-formerly the heralds of sociopolitical discontent and religious liberalism-learned, often from bitter experience, that élite patronage and publication prospects were generally closed to those who resisted the tide of convention. And after , especially, the North's Protestant schoolmasters fell under the sway of conservative clergymen, their own ranks successively purged of "disloyalty" and "heresy" by men, such as Cooke, who increasingly dominated the Ulster Synod and other religious bodies and who distributed their resources according to political and doctrinal criteria.⁴⁰ Over time such influences, and others less obvious but continuous, were instrumental in shaping the mentalité of ordinary Ulster Protestants. No doubt most crucial and pervasive were a multitude of everyday signals, hierarchically imposed but laterally reinforced, that conformity to "respectable" and "loyal" norms of behavior and opinion-the two at least rhetorically indivisible-were essential prerequisites for favorable leases, steady employment, decent wages, extended credit, rapid promotion, and charity during hard times-as well as for the subtler comforts of social and religious fellowship, for a sense of "community," that lessened the sting of poverty in psychological if not material ways. The most important signals, especially at first, were made by those who had the greatest resources and power to bestow or withhold rewards, but eventually they were reinforced by sub-élites, social intermediaries, and, in the end, by all those who, consciously or unconsciously, acknowledged their legitimacy. Thus, the early and mid-nineteenthcentury transformation of the Harshaws, Presbyterian farmers in West Down, from open sympathizers with Catholic emancipation and repeal into unionists and Orangemen, was instructive and perhaps typical, as its younger members were enmeshed in webs of credit and other obligations to members of the Orange Order, while the older ones were publicly attacked by local clergymen for refusing either to join the Order or to acknowledge the unionist dictum that Protestantism, unionism, and respectability were synonymous and interdependent.⁴¹ Finally, the success of these hegemonic pressures was both revealed and, most important, ensured by the massive size and selective character of early and mid-nineteenth century Ulster Protestant emigration. Between the end of the American Revolution and the beginning of the Great Famine, at least one quarter-million and probably closer to one half-million Protestants-principally small farmers, cottiers, and weavers, and disproportionately Presbyterians-left an Ulster which, near its demographic height in , contained fewer than . million Protestants.⁴² To be sure, centuries-old links with America and, especially in South and West Ulster, competition from Catholics no doubt encouraged much northern Protestant emigration. Significantly, however, it was precisely in mid-Ulster's parishes, in the most heavily industrialized regions that in the early s were subject to the greatest socioeconomic dislocations and conflicts-and that also were the epicenters of Anglican loyalism and Orangeism-where the largest disparities between Anglican and Presbyterian growth rates and, hence, out-migration occurred.⁴³ Many fugitives were like John McBride, a Presbyterian weaver from County Antrim, who emigrated so he would not "have to stand like a beggar at a manufacturer's door."⁴⁴ Others included the predominantly Presbyterian small farmers and cottage artisans whom John Gamble observed, shortly after the Napoleonic Wars, who explained their decisions to emigrate in terms that mixed bitter criticism of landlordism and of post-union Ulster's social and political hierarchies with republican dreams of the political "freedom" and socioeconomic "independence" they hoped to enjoy in the United States.⁴⁵ And still others were the weavers and laborers who migrated to northern England's industrial towns where, in the early s, they became notorious for the radicalism of their trade unionism and political activities, and where-in a revealing example of Irish and British élite convergence-they often fell victim to spies and informers whom the British government recruited among yet other Ulster migrants who were members of the Orange Order.⁴⁶
In conclusion, the "taming" of Ulster's Protestant lower classes would be a prolonged and uneasy development, involving the transformation of "Wild Irish" in America and Britain into respectable "Scotch-Irish" and "loyal Britons," as well as the creation of staunch unionists in Northern Ireland itself.⁴⁷ Even the latter process would remain bedeviled by intracommunal conflicts-over tenant-right and industrial relations, for example-as Ulster's Protestant upper, middle, and lower classes sought to define the practical implications of unionism in different ways. From at least the middle of the nineteenth century, however, such issues would be contested almost invariably within the "unionist family": within a hegemonic framework of shared political, social, and cultural assumptions that had been forged and imposed by Ulster's Protestant élites in the early s. Thus, "Belfast's first bomb" in  was by no means the most destructive that would be exploded during the next two centuries. To historians, however, it may signal the importance of a hitherto-unappreciated, intra-communal social conflict, the resolution of which was of momentous importance for the future of Ulster and Irish society.
